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EC Regulation of the Export of Dangerous 
Pharmaceuticals to Third World Countries: 
Some Prospects 
ABSTRACT. "Double standards" in the regulatory status of pharmaceuticals enable 
the pharmaceutical industry to dump to third world countries medicines whose use 
is restricted or banned domestically. Numerous initiatives have been taken at the 
international level to tackle the problem, namely by the World Health Organisation. 
Tue European Community remained for a long time silent and promoted a laissez-
faire policy, thereby giving .:arte blanche for the uncontrolled export of pharmaceu-
ticals. However, a change of the European Community's attitude towards the export 
issue seems to be in the offing. Tue paper analyses the possibilities of the European 
Community to participate in the already existing WHO regulatory mechanisms and 
to design Community actions with the aim of curbing the trade with dangerous 
pharmaceuticals. 
The export of pharmaceuticals to the countries of the Third W orld is 
the subject of emotionally-charged arguments in our prosperous 
industrial society to a greater extent than almost any other issue. The 
industrial countries and the pharmaceutical industry established 
there have sought and are still seeking to create the impression that 
the export of pharmaceuticals per se deserves to be promoted and 
supported because it helps to alleviate the yawning deficits in the 
health care sector of the developing countries. On the other side, 
there is mounting criticism of a health philosophy founded on the 
view that the more pharmaceuticals are exported to the Third World 
countries, the sooner the health problems will be resolved. lt is not 
more pharmaceuticals that are required, but "essential drugs," which 
take into account the medicinal needs of the developing countries. 
The European and American pharmaceutical industries are vehe-
mently resisting export restrictions and advocate free world trade in 
pharmaceuticals as the best guarantee of optimal health care in the 
developing countries. But despite all the protests of the pharma-
ceutical industry, the reality of the situation affirms the need for 
regulation. lt is not essential, or not solely essential, drugs which are 
exported, but principally a whole host of products whose use poses a 
hazard to the consumers in the developing countries, which are 
simply ineffective or unsuitable, unnecessarily overpriced, or else 
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formulated in such an irrational manner as to rule out any meaningful 
therapeutic applications (Barber & Barnacel, 1984; Broch, 1984; 
Medawar, 1984). 
Every one of these problem areas would justify an in-depth 
discussion. However, this paper is confining itself to the category of 
"dangerous" pharmaceuticals. In inf ormed circles it is clear what is 
meant here: the export of pharmaceuticals whose use in the indus-
trial countries is restricted or whose marketing or manufacture is 
banned, but which nevertheless are exported to the Third World. 
This practice goes under the heading "double standards" intema-
tionally. lt is thus not the supply of pharmaceuticals to the Third 
World or the international trade in pharmaceuticals, but solely the 
export of "dangerous" pharmaceuticals which forms the subject of 
our study. Strictly speaking this constitutes one small facet of a vast 
problem (Medawar, 1979; Melrose, 1982). And yet the everyday 
practice of "double standards" is a reflection of the overall problem 
of the supply of pharmaceuticals in the Third World. The search for 
appropriate control instruments is conditioned by the very much 
broader context of pharmaceutical supplies of "essential products" to 
the developing countries (WHO Expert Committee, 1983). To this 
extent the development of a plan for regulating exports of dangerous 
pharmaceuticals must be seen as a first attempt to deal with the 
whole problem of pharmaceutical supplies in the countries of the 
Third World. 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF PHAR1\-1ACEUTICAL EXPORTS: AN 
OVERVIEW 
In order to locate the possibilities for the European Community of 
formulating an export policy, it is indispensable to look at the 
regulatory initiatives already taken at the international level. 
Strictly speaking there is no international regulation of pharma-
ceutical exports, or to be more precise, a regulation of this kind is, at 
the most, in the process of emerging. For even the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) as the most important international actor is 
pursuing no special expert policy and has never done so. In the 40 
years since the founding of WHO a whole range of initiatives has 
been launched with export regulation as their objective, but all the 
time the goalposts were moving farther apart (Cone, 1983; Kay, 
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1976; Stenze!, 1981). lt was really only the Thalidornide disaster 
which prompted WHO to perceive pharmaceutical supplies as a 
political and social problem. The next advance took place in the '70s 
when the supply of pharmaceuticals in the Third World had become 
a problem which could no langer be ignored. As a consequence the 
World Health Organisation was compelled to gear its health policy 
more closely to the needs of the Third W orld. 
The '60s saw above all the attempts to place Third World nations 
in a position to take their own decisions as consumers who have, as 
it were, "reached maturity," by means of an organised information 
exchange. The '70s brought a m01e strongly interventionist style of 
policy, as also in the industrial countries with the United States 
taking the lead. A direct expression of this policy is the Essential 
Drugs Programme (Stenzel, 1981, p. 217) and regulation by means 
of a Code of Conduct (Cone, 1983, pp. 331-361) particularly 
aimed at combatting unfair marketing practices by the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
At present, in a fundamentally different international political 
situation, in which the World Health Organisation has to live with 
the permanent threat by the USA to withdraw its funds, it is a matter 
of consolidating the policy of the '70s, although all too often this is 
thinly-veiled regression. The World Health Organisation has lost the 
momentum of the '70s, and the United States has watered down the 
interventionist elements so that it is scarcely appropriate to talk 
about a Marketing Code any langer. The Third World countries 
have registered the attempts of the industrial states to put a stop to a 
further politicisation of WHO's health policy and have moved the 
debate on exports of dangerous drugs to the forum of the UN 
General Assembly. Against the fierce resistance only of the United 
States, the famous Resolution 37 /137 was adopted, calling on the 
General Secretariat to draw up a Consolidated List of banned or 
severely restricted products.1 
Europe had until then played no part in the international debate 
on the export of drugs. A laissez-faire policy prevailed into the '80s, 
giving a carte blanche for the export of drugs to the member states of 
the European Community as well as to the EC itself. 
The first move towards a change was made by the Council of 
Europe. In 1983 the Council of Europe passed Recommendation 
969 (1983) on the Sale of European Pharmaceutical Products in the 
Countries of the Third World.2 This recommendation calls on the 
32 Ham-W. Mdlitz 
governments of the member countries to support WHO in drafting a 
Code of Marketing Practices, to step up their participation in the 
WHO Certification Scheme, to stand by the developing countries in 
their efforts to build up a rational and economically-acceptable drugs 
policy, to help WHO to implement the Essential Drug Action 
Programme, as weil as to subject drugs intended for export to 
identical rules to those for domestic consumption. Tue work of the 
Council of Europe is institutionally linked to the harmonisation 
efforts of the EC to create a common market for pharmaceuticals. 
For the European Pharmacopoeia has provided the EC with a 
significant basis upon which to build and to which it also refers in 
Directive 75/313.3 Moreover, the Council of Europe, alongside 
WHO, represents the most important international body which deals 
with the regulation of pharmaceuticals. 
In the EC it appears that the way is also being paved towards a 
change in the export policy pursued until now. The European 
Parliament has taken up the gauntlet, flung down by the Council of 
Europe. Tue Banotti Report and the Resolution based upon it 4 is the 
first EC/European document concerning the export of pharmaceuti-
cals. Tue resolution calls for greater co-operation between the EC 
and WHO, while no langer advocating the necessity of establishing a 
WHO Code of Marketing Practices. Instead it recommends that 
pharmaceutical exports be notified and suggests looking into the 
possibility of instituting an export ban in particular cases. 
PROSPECTS AND INSTRUMENTS FOR EC REGULATION OF 
THE EXPORT OF DANGEROUS PHARMACEUTICALS 
Competence ofthe EC to Issue Export Restrictions 
Objections that the EC could not pursue any export policy to 
regulate dangerous drugs were overtumed by the Commission 
proposal for a "Council Regulation concerning export from and 
import into the Community of certain dangerous chemicals." 5 The 
Commission bases its project on Art. 113 of the EEC Treaty. 
Nowhere in the EEC Treaty is it stated what is to be understood by 
export policy within the meaning of Art. 113 of the Treaty. How-
ever, there seems tobe a unanimous view that an export policy very 
probably may formulate restrictions, and does not have to be solely 
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guided by economic and trade policy considerations (Bourgoignie, 
1986; Pallemaerts, 1985; Pescatore, 1969). Now it could be argued 
that in so doing the EC is in violation of Regulation 2603/69 on the 
establishment of common export rules.6 
In the introduction to this regulation it is stated that: "Exports 
from the Community to third countries (are free), i.e., are not 
subject to any quantitative restrictions." However, any regulation of 
exports interferes with the "free" export of goods. Two arguments 
show that the principles of export regulation cannot have a pre-
emptive effect. In the first case Art. 11 of the regulation leaves it up 
to the individual member states to introduce export restrictions for 
public health reasons. In this respect the autonomy enshrined in Art. 
36 of the EEC Treaty is guaranteed. Secondly, the member states 
can partially relinquish their autonomy and override the purely trade 
oriented export policy with regulations based on health policy 
considerations. The adoption of the Consumer and Environmental 
Protection Programme in the '70s was, after all, no more than just 
that(Krämer, 1986;Reich, 1987). 
More important still than the formal legal disputes over compe-
tence - which have never yet made an impression on the Commission 
and the Council - is the absence of a European pharmaceuticals 
authority. Unlike WHO the EC does, it is true, have regulatory 
powers, but it is not, any more than WHO itself, a supranational 
supervisory authority. In concrete terms this means that the Com-
mission has a scope for action in the area of pharmaceuticals control 
only to the extent that the Council confers the appropriate powers 
upon it through directives or regulations. In fact the Commission has 
only succeeded to a limited degree in wresting such powers from the 
member states. To start with, there is the information about the 
activities of the national pharmaceuticals inspection authorities, quite 
apart from the Commission's own regulatory powers for the creation 
of a common market. For this reason the EC itself has very little 
information which could serve as a basis for an EC export policy. 
But the prerequisite of any EC intemal market or export policy must 
be centrally-administered information in the hands of the Commis-
sion. Strictly speaking, therefore, the formulation of an export policy 
is closely associated with the completion of the internal market and, 
more concretely, an extension of the regulatory powers of the 
Commission. We want to confine ourselves to examining the input 
which the EC can make towards the international exchange of 
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information in the present legal situation as weil as the form to 
be taken by, where appropriate, Commission-administered expon 
notification or export control for dangerous pharmaceuticals. 
Exchange of Information 
EC procedures. There are two avenues open to the EC for obtaining 
information about the regulatory decisions of the supervisory author-
ities in the member states. A third instrument, the rapid information 
system set up in 1984, 7 does not eo ver pharmaceuticals. 
1. According to Art. 33 of Directive 75/319 "(each Member 
State) shall take all the appropriate measures to ensure that decisions 
authorizing marketing, refusing or revoking a marketing authorization, 
cancelling a decision refusing or revoking a marketing authorization, 
prohibiting supply, or withdrawing a product from the market, 
together with the reasons on which such decisions are based, are 
brought to the attention of the Committee (for Proprietary Medicinal 
Products) forthwith." 8 
2. According to Art. 9 and 13 of Directive 65/65, as amended 
by Directive 83/570,9 the Committee for Proprietary Medicinal 
Products shall receive the following documents, in the event that 
a pharmaceutical manufacturer has made use of the Multi-State 
Procedure: among the subrnitted documents the summary of the 
characteristics of the product according to the information given 
by the rnanufacturer, and the evaluation report drawn up by the 
national supervisory authority. Tue basis for the work of the Com-
rnittee is forrned by the manufacturer's product summary and the 
authority's evaluation report. Tue Multi-State Procedure should 
facilitate the EC-wide approval of a pharmaceutical product which 
has already undergone the full inspection procedure in one member 
state. 
Each of these two avenues of information has its own particular 
drawbacks. Tue obligation of notification in Art. 33 is, it is true, 
unlirnited, so that the Comrnission, through the Committee, should 
have a complete overall picture of all the regulatory measures of the 
member states. However, this obligation does have a weak point with 
far-reaching consequences: it does not include the very measures 
which are in practice of relevance in this area. These measures are 
the temporary decisions of the authorities and "voluntary recalls" by 
the manufacturers, which are very often induced by gentle pressure 
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from the authorities. In practice, however, it seems that an exchange 
of information between the national authorities, and including the 
Commission, is actually starting to take place which goes beyond the 
formal limits of Art. 33. There is unanimous agreement about this. In 
this way the Commission should have to some degree a complete 
overall picture of the cöntent and extent of both the official and 
voluntary marketing restrictions. Only what is actually happening 
remains concealed from the public since the exchange of information 
is subject to secrecy. 
The Multi-State Procedure first came into force in October 1985 
so that any assessment would seem to be premature. However, the 
structural deficits cannot be disregarded. The whole procedure is 
optional, i.e„ a pharmaceutical manufacturer may make use of the 
regulation if he anticipates that it would speed up his application for 
drug approval in another EC country. The evaluation reports and 
product summaries are exchanged between the authorities as soon as 
a pharmaceutical manufacturer has initiated the multi-state proce-
dure. The Commission is only notified through the committee when 
the member state applied to decides not to give its authorisation or if 
a member state withdraws, suspends, etc., authorisation which it has 
approved previously, even though the product still continues to 
circulate unrestrictedly in another member state. This is awkward as 
far the Commission is concemed because both reports, one from the 
manufacturer's viewpoint and the other from that of the drugs 
approval authorities, sum up the results of the analytical, toxico-
logical and pharmacological clinical examination. The information 
transferred is substantially more specific in nature than the mere 
"indication of grounds" laid down in Art. 33. So in the final analysis, 
the inforrnation situation at the Commission depends on how widely 
the drugs evaluations of the member states differ. Only in the case 
of the recently adopted new regulation on the approval of bio-
technology drugs does the product summary and evaluation report 
have to be forwarded to the Comrnittee for Proprietary Medicinal 
Products.10 Here, for the first time, the approval procedure has been 
centralised to some degree. 
The deficiencies analysed demonstrate the urgent need to develop 
an effective rapid information system for pharmaceuticals (Bour-
goignie, 1986), without which the Commission will be unable either 
to respond to any gaps in regulation within the EC itself, or to make 
any fundamental contribution to the international exchange of infor-
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mation. Among the measures needed here are the formal inclusion 
of voluntary marketing restrictions in the notification obligation in 
Art. 33, but in particular the unrestricted circulation of the product 
summaries and evaluation reports amongst the competent authorities 
of the member countries and the Commission. Tue secrecy problem 
is awaiting a solution. Tue Commission interprets Art. 214 of the 
EEC Treaty very broadly and in this way has considerably restricted 
the degree of external access to the information sources. There is an 
urgent need to strike a balance between the public interest and the 
interest of protecting secrecy. This requires a fundamental review of 
what has been the practice until now. 
WHO Drug Circular, WHO Drug Bulletin, UN Consolidated List. If 
the EC member states adhere to the notification obligations entered 
into with \VIIO and the UN, the separate input of the EC alone 
would simply double the amount of information already available. In 
actual fact it is likely that the information flow will be better in the 
opposite direction, i.e„ the Commission may possibly acquire more 
information, and in more detail, through the \VIIO Bulletin than it 
possesses itself. Matters may be otherwise for the products on the 
Consolidated List because some member states (FRG, United King-
dom) are pursuing a restrictive notification policy. What exactly the 
EC information situation is, it is not possible to teil. Tue EC is not 
formally empowered to store all detailed decisions as data and to 
compile a list. Tue reports of the Committee for Proprietary Medici-
nal Products are still the only source of information. However, they 
are brief and are often published after a considerable time lag. 
WHO Certification Scheme and evaluation reports. In the short term, 
perhaps the most interesting possibilities for co-operation reside in 
the further development of the Certification Scheme. However, this 
is subject to \VIIO and the EC finding a basis for working together 
in a climate of mutual trust. \VIIO regards the EC as a "Club of 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers" (Stenzel, 1981 ), while the EC for its 
part has considerable reservations about the Essential Drugs Action 
Programme and the \VIIO "Code of Marketing Practices." 
Tue object of the \VIIO Certification Scheme is to give a quality 
guarantee for exported products. The provisions of Chapters IV 
"Manufacture" and V "Supervision" of Directive 7 5/319 11 are also 
applicable to products intended for export. In this respect the EC 
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defines a universal quality standard above the standards of the WHO 
"Good Manufacturing Practices." lt constitutes a violation of current 
EC law for the member countries to export drugs which do not 
satisfy the standards laid down there. Even though sanctions me-
chanisms do not exist, the supply of inferior quality products would 
nevertheless be a political matter which could damage the reputation 
of the pharmaceutical industry. However, such cases are seldom 
made public because the developing countries concemed - even 
assuming that they (can) register such an occurrence - tend to insist 
on a substitute or further supply. The pharmaceutical company 
concemed, meanwhile, is likely to only agree to this if it is assured of 
strict secrecy. 
WHO is currently conducting a survey to see whether the member 
states are prepared to supplement certification by means of accom-
panying documents on safety and effectiveness (Wehrli, 1986). In the 
case in point, this would simply consist of the evaluation reports. In 
the event of a positive response the Commission could therefore 
bring the existence of these evaluation reports in the member states 
to the attention of the WHO. Since the developing countries gen-
erally send their requests under the certification scheme to WHO 
(ICDRA, 1984), it would be easy for the latter to include a reference 
to the existence of the evaluation reports in its reply to the develop-
ing countries or to ask the exporting countries to band over the 
evaluation reports. A similar procedure could be used for the 
manufacturer's product summaries. 
Product summaries and evaluation reports as a basis for compiling 
a European pharmaceutical users' handbook. Tue Commission is 
largely resting its hopes for creating an intemal market for pharma-
ceuticals on the prospects associated with the many potential uses of 
both the newly-acquired sources of information. These are, it is true, 
to be treated confidentially, even if notified to the Committee. But it 
is still a question of fundamental importance whether this policy is 
sustainable in the long run. The United States of America do not 
have manifold restrictions on access to data, without this having had 
any known adverse impact on the US pharmaceutical industry until 
now. Publicly accessible product summaries and evaluation reports 
could provide the basis on which to develop a European Users 
Handbook. This handbook would in effect be based on officially-
checked information and not on information given by the pharma-
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ceutical industry. What the Commission is considering is modelled 
on the French VIDAL scheme under which checked information is 
separately labelled. 
For the developing countries such a document, particularly in the 
official EC languages, would be of great value. In this project a large 
number of existing international initiatives could be drawn together 
and channeled into the compilation of an international handbook. 
WHO could contribute its Data Sheets on Essential Drugs and 
revive the ideas advanced at the time in Copenhagen to register 
"Scientific Evaluation Documents" 12 throughout the world. From the 
point of view of the non-govemmental organisations the handbook 
would have to be measured against the standard of the Action Pack 
on Problem Drugs. Even by modest standards, this could produce 
the companion piece to the International Register of Potentially 
Toxic Chemicals (IRPTC). This contains basic information broken 
down into 17 categories concerning the 500 main chemicals. The 
scheme is freely accessible to anyone. 
Export Notification 
The crucial passage in the resolution of the European Parliament is 
quoted below because it seems eminently suitable as a basis for 
discussion: 
Tue European Parliarnent calls on the Community Institutions to develop and adopt 
a directive to approximate the Member States' laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the export of pharmaceutical products with the intention of 
prohibiting the export of products which are banned, withdrawn, or subject to 
special restriction within the Community market or which have not been registered 
for that market, unless authorities in the importing country specifically request the 
product having first been fully informed of the controls on its use in Europe, and 
that all notifications and responses by importing countries should be published by 
the Commission.13 
By taking over such a regulation the Commission would be treading 
new political ground. Tue pharmaceutical industry will for that 
reason put up even more vigorous opposition to regulation than the 
chemical industry, which has been confronted with demands for 
export notification for years. In reality a sense of company identity 
often exists, although this does not appear to have caused any breach 
in the industry's ranks. However, the different nature of chemicals 
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and pharmaceuticals does not provide any grounds for objections to 
export notification. For export notification has not been discussed 
intemationally until now only because the World Health Organisa-
tion had advocated far tougher intervention measures to deal with 
the double standards problem. The main arguments against export 
notification as such continue to revolve around the suitability of the 
instrument, the definition of its scope and what form the procedure 
would take in practice. The opponents of export notification fear a 
bureaucratisation of the pharmaceutical trade which could quite 
easily hamper the exchange of goods and yet still not achieve its 
intended objective. The assessment criteria in the industrial countries 
still continue to be so different that it would not be possible to find a 
standard definition for the two key categories of banned and severely 
restricted products. Finally, it is argued, prior informed consent as 
the most highly-developed form of export notification would have 
the effect of hindering trade with the developing countries and would 
be tantamount to an export control. 
Admittedly, export notification results in a bureaucratisation of 
pharmaceutical trade with the developing countries. This would 
apply all the more if, as the non-govemmental organisations have 
been demanding for some time, every shipment had to be notified 
separately. Also not to be brushed aside are the difficulties involved 
in the processing of detailed information in the developing countries. 
In many cases these countries do not have sufficient personnel and 
technical resources. Preliminary studies of the efficacy of notifica-
tions are not exactly encouraging (Lindsay, 1985). Most of the 
notifications sent by the American Environmental Protection Agency 
get no further than the US Embassy of the developing country 
concemed, and are never received at the intended destination, 
namely the competent authority in the importing country. 
Naturally the industrial countries only have limited powers to 
remedy the deficiencies in the official infrastructure in the developing 
countries. But from these undoubted shortcomings to then draw the 
conclusion that export notification is an unsuitable means for tackling 
the double Standards problem, in the case in point, is simply to 
patronise the developing countries. For without information from the 
industrial countries the latter are unable to make an informed 
decision on their own responsibility. The mere exchange of informa-
tion, decoupled from the export, does not suffice in itself because 
there is no guarantee that the competent authority in the importing 
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country really has the necessary information to hand. Tue notification 
must compensate for the organisational and information deficiencies 
of the developing country. In the industrial countries the view that 
consumer information is sufficiently provided for when it can be 
obtained "on the market" has long been out of date. Likewise, a 
mechanism needs to be built into the notification scheme between 
industrial and developing countries which not only provides them 
with the opportunity to obtain the information, but ensures that they 
really are given it in practice. 
Consequently, the attempts to repudiate prior informed consent 
as an instrument of export control are also hardly convincing. By 
providing the developing countries with a procedural safeguard, 
prior informed consent should enable them in practice to take 
decisions on their own responsibility. 
Tue opponents of prior informed consent see in the necessary 
approval of the competent authorities in the importing country a 
restriction on the movement of goods because not only the importer 
but also an authority must decide on whether or not to give the 
go-ahead for the export. There are two arguments here: guaranteeing 
the sovereignty of the developing country requires the involvement 
of the competent authority in the export; and on the other band, it is 
a matter of course for the industrial countries that the import of 
products which are potentially hannful to health is subject to state 
control. 
The idea of prior inf ormed consent is a very familiar concept in 
the health sector. For in our legal system the patient must give 
consent for treatment and in some cases a written statement is even 
required. 
Not to be shrugged off, on the other hand, are the difficulties 
involved in a precise formulation of terms. In its first report on the 
assessment of the Consolidated List, 14 the UN showed a way which 
appears to hold considerable promise. Since the disputes over the 
definition of, in particular, the "severely restricted" category are 
receiving more and more attention, this attempt at a definition is 
quoted in full below: 
Severely restricted: a product containing: 
(b) A substance that may be incorporated in pharmaceutical dosage forms only 
within the specific limits determined by statute; 
(c) A substance that is approved by competent national authority subject to 
restrictions that exclude its use in a substantial proportion of the potential target 
population of patients. 
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Of course, this definition of terminology does not remove all 
doubt. There is much which remains to be clarified. Without prag-
matism, however, it will not be possible, even at EC level, to fix on a 
standard notification practice. The UN Secretariat has set itself the 
task of defining the tenn more precisely in the light of detailed 
information. So in the future it may be possible to define for certain 
groups of drugs and for certain indications, those restrictions on use 
which are deemed to be so serious that they should fall under the 
obligation of notification. Finally there is always the reference to the 
much called for own responsibility of the developing countries. The 
latter should be able to decide for themselves whether a restriction 
on sale imposed once constitutes sufficient grounds for refusing to 
approve the export or whether they wish to first wait for the opinion-
forming process to run its course in a number of industrial countries. 
Envisaged regulation of chemicals and pesticides as a model? In 
the event that a discussion takes place within the Commission on 
whether export notification for pharmaceuticals should be intro-
duced, it is to be expected that the proposal for a regulation of the 
"export of certain dangerous chemicals" will be taken as a model. lt 
is therefore worth taking a closer look at the proposal. By this 
initiative, the EC's aim is to honour the international commitments 
entered into by its member countries in the OECD, F AO, and 
UNEP (EC Commission, 1986, p. 1 ). 
The consensus reached is best reflected in the OECD recommen-
dation dating from 1984 (OECD, 1984) directed at the member 
States. At the same time it found its way into the F AO Code of 
Conduct on Pesticides (F AO, 1985) and into the UNEP Provisional 
Notification Scheme (UNEP, 1984). The critical passages in each of 
these regulation documents are not only identical in content but even 
in wording, apart from a few minimal differences. The developing 
countries as well as the non-govemmental organisations have sought 
in vain to get the concept of Prior Informed Consent internationally 
accepted. The notification model advanced by the OECD is far-
removed from such a system since it allows notification "at the time 
of the export." The exporting countries are, it is true, urged to give 
notification of the export prior to shipment where possible, but 
under this model it would be enough for the exporting states to 
simply inform the developing countries on a single occasion that the 
export of dangerous pesticides or chemicals of this type has already 
taken place. 
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In actual fact, the EC's regulation proposal goes beyond the 
consensus reached internationally (in the OECD) of the industrial 
countries. As from 1.1.1989 the principle of "informed choice" is to 
take effect, according to which hazardous chemicals may only be 
exported to those countries which have given their prior consent to 
the import (EC Commission, 1986, Art. 4(1)). However, this would 
only apply if unanimity is achieved on this at international level. At 
the same time the Commission would be assigned the mandate, on 
behalf of the member states, to work with the OECD and UNEP 
towards modifying the export notification arrangements. In practice, 
this relates to the inclusion of the USA in the informed choice 
solution. The developing countries will welcome any improvement to 
the notification scheme. 
The criticisms of the non-governmental organisations are set out 
in a position paper by the Coalition Against Dangerous Exports 
(CADE, 1986). In this paper the organisations belonging to the 
coalition criticise the abandonment of the concept of prior informed 
consent. For according to the EC proposal, the export would still be 
possible if the Commission had not received any communication 
from the country of destination within 60 days from the date of 
despatch of notification. This provision could in the long run lead to 
an undermining of the actual concept of informed consent itself. For 
many developing countries, despite good intentions, are not likely to 
be in a position to take an "informed" decision in 60 days. Tue 
developing countries would be faced with the doubtful choice of 
whether to allow the deadline to pass without taking any action, or 
eise to consent to the export before the deadline expires even though 
they have not actively taken a decision at all. 
A second point of criticism concerns the scope of the measures to 
be notified. According to the regulation proposal, the Commission -
not the member states, it should be noted, but the Commission -
notifies the country of destination of the export of all the measures 
set out in the annex to the regulation proposal. These concern 23 
products which are subject to a ban or severe restriction on sale 
within the Community. The Coalition Against Dangerous Exports is 
demanding that the Commission be empowered to also notify the 
developing countries of those regulatory measures introduced by the 
member states to apply in their own territory. The reason for this 
demand is the justified assumption that restrictions on marketing at 
EC level only represent the smallest common denominator and in no 
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way reflect the contradictions in the different assessments of the 
risks associated with chemicals by the member states. This demand 
may be politically desirable, but for the time being it is thwarted by 
the Commission's lack of authority to pass on information about the 
regulatory measures of the member states. A European environment 
authority simply does not exist either! Astonishingly enough, the 
European Parliament has recently taken over most of CADE's pro-
posals for improvement - introduction of Prior Informed Consent 
and enlargement of the list. 15 
The future of export notification. The debate on export notific'!tion 
has made great strides intemationally. Quite another question is 
whether the member states are prepared to agree to a legally binding 
regulation. The initial discussions on the proposal within the EC 
have dampened the hopes of the developing countries and the 
non-govemmental organisations. Tue "bureaucratisation" of the flow 
of infonnation has met with disapproval, nor does "prior informed 
choice" seem to have overturned the objections to notification. For 
these reasons it seems possible that the industrial countries will push 
for the establishment of the compromise negotiated in the OECD in 
1984. The revision of the UNEP Provisional Notification Scheme in 
February 1987 has confirmed this assumption (UNEP, 1986). All 
the industrial countries, except for the Netherlands, defend the 
OECD/FAO formula as a compromise line, beyond which it would 
currently be difficult to attain a regulation. 
The Governing Council of UNEP has recently opened a new 
round of negotiations on Prior lnformed Consent. Together with 
the adoption of the notification scheme 16 the Goveming Council 
"requests the Executive Director to convene an ad hoc Working 
Group of experts with a view to: (a) Developing procedures of prior 
informed consent and other approaches which could usefully sup-
plement the procedures of the London Guidelines (the Notification 
Scheme); (b) Recornmending measures for incorporating the prin-
ciple of prior informed consent in the Guidelines; (c) Reporting on 
its findings to the next regular session of the Goveming Council." 
lt might well be that a comparable solution will be found in the 
Council of Ministers, viz., the adoption of the OECD system, 
combined with a mandate to the Comrnission to participate in the 
international negotiations. In any case the export notification of 
drugs can only succeed if the problem of severely restricted drugs 
44 Hans-W.~tz 
has been resolved. Efforts will have to be directed towards precisely 
defining this category. 
Export Controls 
Since the European Community can lay down legally binding law for 
its member states, in theory it is free to make the export of drugs 
subject to the issue of a special licence or permit, or else to some 
other form of official requirement. A restrictive control policy which 
extends beyond the exchange of information and export notification, 
was first discussed in the United States under President Carter and 
even brought into effect for a short period (Childress, 1981; Scherr, 
1985; Schulberg, 1979). For the EC, until now, only the BEUC and 
IOCU have called for such measures (BEUC & IOCU, 1985; 
Bourgoignie, 1986; Harland, 1985). In view of the above comments 
on the pharmaceutical industry's attitude to any kind of intervention 
in exports, it is not hard to imagine how they would react to this. The 
nature and quality of the arguments put forward to justify export 
controls are therefore of crucial importance. Only when this hurdle 
has been surmounted the way will be open to think about the 
mechanisms of an EC control. The European Parliament expressly 
calls upon the Commission to do just this (see Footnote 4, Resolu-
tion Proposal No. 9). Lastly, it remains tobe made clear just how the 
EC can help to promote WHO's efforts to introduce controls. 
Justification for export controls. The opponents and proponents have 
been swapping arguments for a long time. Each side has adopted its 
stance and the positions have hardened. Y et it is the exporting 
pharmaceutical industry which stands to gain the most from the 
status quo of the laissez-faire policy. 
The debate on export controls has a profoundly moralist slant to 
it. The opponents who, as weil as the pharmaceutical industry, until 
now have included all the industrial states with the exception of the 
Netherlands (Melrose, 1982, p. 166) see export control as inter-
ference in the sovereignty of the developing countries (Chetley, 
1985, 1986). No country has the right to force upon another its own 
criteria of assessment for public health and safety. Or, in polemical 
terms, as the author of a newspaper article has asked: Can the 
United States be a nanny to the Third World (International nanny, 
1980)? Developing countries, thus goes the unanimous view, should 
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be able to decide for themselves what risks they are to impose on 
their people. Tue sovereignty argument is backed up with references 
to possible differences of a cultural and socio-economic nature 
which necessitate a different way of looking at health risks. Put less 
diplomatically: the deplorable state of health care in the developing 
countries can justify double standards because the cost-benefit 
analysis is different (Chetley, 1985, 1986). 
The proponents - countries of the Group of 77 - as weil as a 
number of non-govemmental organisations, are pursuing a legitima-
tion strategy on two levels (BEUC & IOCU, 1985). On the one 
hand, they are appealing to the moral responsibility of the exporting 
countries and in particular of the pharmaceutical industry. The 
exporting countries, with their high level of scientific and techno-
logical knowledge, could and should not expose consumers in the 
developing countries to risks which they no langer impose on their 
own citizens. Tue pharmaceutical industry is damaging itself if it 
exports inferior products since this would tarnish its image. On the 
other hand they point to the irrationality of the sovereignty argu-
ment. For this assumes first of all that the importing countries 
actually have all the personnel and technical resources required to be 
able to take sovereign decisions on their own responsibility. Further-
more, the industrial countries would have far fewer scruples about 
limiting the sovereignty of the developing countries if possible quid 
pro quo's were involved (such as supply conditions) in return for 
development aid. Socio-cultural differences, finally, could lead to a 
divergent evaluation in individual cases, but this does not justify the 
unrestricted export of drugs which contravene the standards of the 
manufacturing country. 
Since it cannot be a question of finding out "who is right," it is 
difficult to assess the pros and cons. lt would be better rather to 
work on the basis of options. "Partisanship" is made difficult because 
the poorest of the poor, namely the developing countries and Africa 
in particular, participate in the international debate - if at all -
through their representatives in Health Action International. Tue 
self-assured developing countries, who can perhaps be described 
collectively as the emergent newly-industrialising countries, are 
inclined to make a show of their sovereignty, even though they may 
not have the personnel and technical resources to take their own 
decisions. The opponents' argument is based on the ideal situation of 
equal partner countries. Behind this assumption can be glimpsed the 
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provisions of Article 36 of the EEC Treaty which lea\•es questions of 
health protection up to the member states. On the other band the 
developing countries react with extreme sensitivity if they feel the~· 
are being patronised. 
The discussion recalls the dispute over the scope and extent of 
consumer protection in numerous programmes in the industrial 
countries. Tue latter, when they do not support a pure laissez-faire 
export policy, advocate an "information model" (Simitis, 1976). Tue 
developing countries should receive the necessary infonnation to be 
able to make their own decision. Export controls, by contrast, would 
be the purest form of "paternalist consumer protection," designed 
to take the decisions away from the developing countries. Such 
"socially-compensating" (sozial-kompensatorische) consumer protec-
tion - i.e„ consumer protection which compensates for particular 
social conditioru; (Reich & Micklitz, 1980), would be regarded as 
justified in the industrial countries in cases where the citizens lack 
the resources and capability to speak for themselves and to look 
after their own interests. There is a tendency for this approach to 
be transposed to the relations between industrial and developing 
countries. A "socially-compensating" export control should place the 
responsibility with the industrial countries but at the same time 
protect the sovereignty of the developing countries. 
Apart from on a moral level, the dispute is principally conducted 
over the possible impact on international competition. Export con-
trols, according to the opponents, would weaken the position of 
those countries which have stringent rules, whereas exporting coun-
tries with a "more lenient" policy would protect their domestic 
industry. Conversely, the proponents emphasise the possible distor-
tions in competition between the EC countries, but also in relations 
between the EC countries and the USA. An international export 
control policy would avoid such distortions in competition and 
define identical standards. lt seems to me that the discussion on 
export controls at trade policy level is being conducted with exag-
gerated arguments on both sides. The United States is probably the 
only country which can lay any claim to having defined an export 
policy which is reflected in practice in the pharmaceuticals trade 
with the Third World. But whether, as Senator Kennedy asserts, 
the American pharmaceutical industry is actually sustaining harm 
because it cannot export unapproved drugs seems to me pure 
speculation. After all, there are no obstacles standing in the way of 
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the export of banned, withdrawn or severely restricted drugs (Sefero-
vich, 1981 ). At the present time there are probably scarcely any 
distortions in competition between the industrial countries. The 
differences in detail are insignificant. To a greater or lesser extent, all 
the industrial countries - with the possible exception of the United 
States in the matter of the export ban on unapproved drugs - are 
pursuing a laissez-faire policy. If one industrial country bad actually 
taken, or were to take a lead in this area, it would considerably 
facilitate the debate on the "moral" level. 
Options for export control regulation. President Carter's Executive 
Order of 1981, in addition to the export notification of "banned and 
severely restricted products," also made provision for a licensing 
procedure for "extremely hazardous products" (Childress, 1981, p. 
685). After identification by the Departrnent of State and the 
Department of Comrnerce, these products were to be placed on a 
Comrnodity Control List. lt was then the task of the Departrnent of 
Comrnerce, after consultation with the State Departrnent and the 
FDA, to decide whether an export licence could be issued. The 
licence was to be issued if the Government of the country of 
destination had raised no objections of any kind and the "export 
would not cause clear and significant harm to United States foreign 
policy interests." Since practical experiences could not be gathered, 
an evaluation must be based on the model. A striking feature is the 
cumbersome nature of the procedure, which involved the participa-
tion of three different bureaucracies. The final decision lays with the 
Department of Comrnerce which could only refuse the licence if the 
foreign policy interests were threatened with serious harm. If, added 
to this, it is considered that only "extremely hazardous products," 
and not for instance the whole range of "double standards" cate-
gories, would be subjected to the licensing procedure, it can be seen 
that the US regulation is substantially more restrictive than it might 
appear at first sight. Although one of Reagan's first actions in office 
was to revoke the Order (Baldridge & Haig, 1982) the U.S. approach 
still stands as the best-conceived instrument - not least because of 
the wide-ranging debate which preceded its adoption. 
Tue IOCU and BEUC have outlined a proposal in their position 
paper on the Banotti Report which goes into the different facets of 
the opposition to introducing export controls (BEUC & IOCU, 
1985). Tue key element of the proposal is the ban in principle on the 
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export of banned, unapproved, and withdrawn drugs, as weil as on 
those drugs whose use is restricted in the home country. Exemptions 
should be possible to this ban, for which the pharmaceutical manu-
facturer could apply for a licence. With this exception-to-the-rule 
principle, the IOCU and BEUC want to put an end to the double 
standards problem, while at the same time opening the way for 
export in cases where this is proved to meet the needs of the 
developing countries. In order to prevent the exception from becom-
ing the rule, both organisations are calling for an objective and 
transparent licensing procedure. All the parties should be involved, 
also and in particular the developing countries who should be 
assigned an active role. In concrete terms, a pharmaceutical company 
which applies for a licence would have to accompany its application 
by information on the following: the effectiveness and safety of the 
drug; the grounds for any restriction on marketing; in the case of an 
unapproved drug: comparable documents to those for the normal 
approval; the packaging and marking in the form to be used for the 
export; an outline of the projected advertising measures. Tue infor-
mation collected, together with any comments by the competent 
export authorities, should then be forwarded to the importing 
country or to the relevant authorities in that country. Once the 
importing country has given advice of receipt, the parties can then 
enter into negotiations with each other. If agreement is reached the 
licence would be issued. The precise conditions for granting the 
licence would be set down in writing. 
Placing domestic products on the same footing as exported 
products would not eliminate the problem of exports of unapproved 
drugs. In this respect the proposal of the IOCU and BEUC is not in 
itself consistent. What the proposal amounts to is the taking over 
of the U.S. regulation. At the same time the problem of double 
standards in advertising and labelling of drugs would no langer 
apply. For the manufacturers would also have to label the products 
intended for export in accordance with Art. 4 of Directive 65/65,17 
i.e., indicating any restrictions. 
Tue ban in principle an exports is considerably more stringent by 
comparison with the American solution. Whereas under Carter's 
Order only "extremely hazardous products" were to be placed an 
the blacklist, the BEUC and IOCU want to impose an export ban 
on all the products in the different categories of double standards. 
Even if such a solution appears to be desirable in the long term, the 
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export control stemming from this demand threatens to lead to over-
bureaucratisation. The USA wanted to avoid this by only subjecting 
extremely hazardous products to export controls. The IOCU/BEUC 
are seeking to deal with the problem by means of a strictly regulated 
exemption procedure. But the exemption procedure may perhaps 
become the rule for the very reason that too many drugs tend to 
come under the ban in principle on exports. lt is therefore worth 
considering whether a general export ban could not be put into the 
concrete form of a list of all those products for which export would 
run counter to the needs of the developing countries. Whether such a 
limitation of the general ban is advisable depends very much on 
whether the plan to compile such a list is successful. The preparation 
of such a list would have to include the participation of the Com-
mittee for Proprietary Medicinal Products, as well as representatives 
from WHO, the developing countries and HAI. In any case, and it is 
certainly thanks to IOCU/BEUC that this had been made clear, the 
licensing procedure must be regulated in a precise manner. However, 
a decisive fattor in the issue of the licence should be whether the 
developing countries still want to be supplied the product after the 
various stages of the procedure have run their course. Tue foreign 
policy interests of the exporting country are not a decisive factor. In 
this respect the sovereignty principle is upheld. 
On purely practical grounds, the question arises as to who should 
administer such a system, the Commission or the member states. In 
the long term the issuing of a licence should be placed in EC hands, 
but such an extension of powers is once again bound up with the 
creation of a European Pharmaceutical Authority. But also con-
ceivable would be a mechanism in which the decisions would be 
co-ordinated with the participation of the EC, but without the 
Commission being responsible for the decision itself. 
Support of WHO policy. In theory the EC could step up its efforts to 
promote the Action Programme on Essential Drugs. A major step 
forward would be to place the co-ordination of the member coun-
tries' various aid programmes in the hands of the EC. Co-ordination 
does not mean administration, but does create transparency and 
possibly closer harmonisation as a consequence in relations among 
the EC countries, but also between the EC and WHO. 
Tue EC is theoretically called upon to support the drawing up of 
a WHO Code of Marketing Practices. For its members had at the 
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time taken this decision jointly. If this falls through owing to op-
position from the United States, there is still the possibility of seeing 
whether the EC could not draw up a Code of Marketing Practices in 
co-operation with the European pharmaceutical industry (see Bour-
goignie, 1986, for the same suggestion). Such a code should add to 
but not replace the option of export control. Either way would call 
for a fundamental reorientation for the EC. Tue extreme slowness in 
dealing with the WHO Breast Milk Substitute Code, as weil as its 
incomplete implementation, in the EC bodies is emphatic proof of 
this (Reich & Smith, 1983).18 
CONCLUSION 
Whether it will ever be possible to develop an export policy in the 
EC is inextricably linked to the completion of the intemal market to 
be achieved by 1992. Only when the EC achieves this aim can it 
obtain the necessary powers to conduct an export policy itself. But 
the interdependence of the policies should not lead. to a ranking of 
priorities. Export policy is part of intemal market policy and can 
even act as a lever to actually drive it forward. The EC is presented 
with a favourable opportunity to take the lead on the international 
front, and on behalf of the industrial countries, to honour the many 
international obligations to apply tougher controls on the export of 
banned and severely restricted pharmaceuticals. 
ADDENDUM 
On February 8, 1988, the Commission of the European Communities published a 
draft directive (OJ No. C 36, 22ss) regulating for the first time the export of 
pharrnaceuticals. The Commission rejects export notification but enhances participa-
tion in WHO's Certification Scheme, Drug Bulletin and Drug Circular: irnporting 
countries should be entitled to request a rnanufacturer's perrnit as well as a product 
summary; rnember states should be obliged to notify regulatory actions as well as 
voluntary suspensions and recalls directly to WHO. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die Regulierung des Exports gefährlicher Arzneimittel in die Dritte Welt durch die 
EG. "Double Standards" im regulatorischen Status von Arzneimitteln ermöglichen 
es der pharmazeutischen Industrie, Produkte, deren Vertrieb in den Industrie-
ländern verboten oder "streng" beschränkt ist, in die Länder der Dritten Welt 
abzusetzen. Die Weltgesundheitsorganisation (WHO) hat eine Reihe von Initiativen 
unternommen, um dem Problem Herr zu werden. Die Europäische Gemeinschaft 
hat sich zurückgehalten und bis in die 80er Jahre eine reine Laissez-Faire Politik 
betrieben. Exporte unterliegen auch nach den derzeitigen gemeinschaftlichen Regeln 
praktisch keinen Beschränkungen. Es mehren sich aber die Anzeichen dafür, daß 
diese Position nicht mehr haltbar ist. Dieses Papier unternimmt den Versuch, die 
Möglichkeiten der EG an einer verstärkten Teilnahme an den vorhandenen 
Mechanismen der WHO auszuloten. Hauptsächlich geht es aber um eine Klärung 
der Frage, ob die EG eine eigenständige Exportpolitik formulieren kann und welche 
Form sie haben könnte und müßte, um die Mißstände zu beseitigen. 
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